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right to keep all rents collected before that date. Rider v. Bagley, 84 N.Y. 461 (i88);
8o U. of Pa. L. Rev. 269 (i931). But since the mortgagee, in title jurisdictions, may
obtain possession upon default by taking some action to enforce this right, it is clear
that the mortgagor's rights after default can be made subordinate to those of the mort-
gagee. See 4 A.L.R. 1400, 1410 (1919); 55 A.L.R. 1020, 1022 (1928). In some older
cases, a demand for possession followed by a bill in equity to enforce this demand has
been held to entitle the mortgagee to rents and profits from the time of the original de-
mand. Dow v. Memphis Ry. Co., 124 U.S. 652 (i888); see Sacramento Ry. v. Super CQ.,
55 Cal. 453 (i88o); Shaw v. Norfolk Ry., 71 Mass. 162 (1855). A mortgagee has also
been allowed to enjoin the mortgagor from further collection of rents, the injunction
being issued "coincident with" the institution of foreclosure proceedings. Howell v.
Ripley, 1o Paige (N.Y.) 43, 44 (1843); Post v. Dorr, 4 Edw. (N.Y.) 412 (I844). A mere
suit for foreclosure, however, is not enough to deprive the mortgagor of his right to
collect rents. Gilman v. 111. & Miss. Tel. Co., 91 U.S. 603 (1875); cf. Johnston v. Riddle,
70 Ala. 219, 225 (x881); see 4 A.L.R. 14oo, 1414. Thus although the pending fore-
closure in the instant case may have been insufficient action by the mortgagee, the
application for a receiver may well be considered a sort of lis pendens operating to pre-
clude the mortgagor from further dealing with the property. See lit re Banner, 149
Fed. 936 (D.C. N.Y. 1907) (receiver allowed to collect rents from the date of the ap-
plication). Thus the court correctly extended the protection of the mortgagee in dis-
allowing the mortgagor's agreement with the tenant.
It has been pointed out that the purpose of most protections to the mortgagee
flowing from receivership was to assure him a reasonable rental from the mortgaged
premises. In the instant case there was a clear showing that the new agreement pro-
vided for an approximately reasonable rental. 4 N.E. (2d) 504, 505. Thus it might be
argued that the court should not place new restrictions on the mortgagor's rights in
order to give the mortgagee an exorbitant rental against the mortgagor's wishes. But
if this agreement had been made after the appointment of a receiver, it would not have
been binding as against the receiver. Therefore, the court in the principal case would
more adequately have disposed of the case had it clearly held the mortgagor's rights
terminated by application for appointment of a receiver where appointment actually
follows, especially since the mortgagor had notice of the pending receivership.
Taxation-Constitutionality of State Tax Covering Costs of Railroad Inspection
-Burden of Proving Constitutionality-[United States].-The state of Washington
imposed a fee of one tenth of one percent of the gross revenue from intrastate opera-
tions on all public utility corporations subject to regulation by its department of public
works, for the purpose of providing funds for the inspection and supervision of such
companies under the public service commission law. ii Remington's Rev. Wash. Stats.
1933, §§ 10417, io418. This department supervised many kinds of public utilities.
Some of its activities in connection with railroads were unrelated to the inspection and
supervision thereof. The funds collected from the railroads, together with those col-
lected from other utilities under the department's supervision, were paid into the de-
partment's general fund, and all expenses of the department were paid indiscriminately
out of that fund, there being no appropriation from the state's general revenues for any
of the department's activities. The state showed that disbursements charged to rail-
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roads exceeded receipts therefrom during the period in question by $37,833. The plain-
tiff introduced evidence, however, tending to show that some disbursements were not
properly allocable to the functions of inspection and supervision. In an action to re-
cover fees paid under protest, held, upon the authority of Foote v. Maryland (232 U.S.
494 (I914)), the state had the burden of showing that sums exacted from the railroads
did not substantially exceed the amounts expended for regulation and supervision.
Four justices dissented on the ground that intermingling of the funds did not shift
from the complainant the burden of showing that it was injured by operation of the
common fund. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Washington, 57 Sup.Ct. 397 (I937).
In holding that the intermingling of funds raised a presumption of invalidity of the
tax, the Court departed from the usual rule which places upon the one attacking a
statute the burden of proving both that it is unconstitutional and that the unconsti-
tutional feature injures him. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S.
682, 688 (1936); Atl. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, i9o U.S. 16o, i65 (Io3); Premier-
Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U.S. 226, 227 (1936); Heald v. District of Columbia, 259
U.S. 114, 123 (1922). Despite the Court's emphasis upon the controlling influence of
the Foote case, the situations in the two cases were not substantially alike. In the
Foote case, it was established by stipulation of the parties that under a previous statute
substantially the same as the one in litigation, the fees collected were more than double
the cost of inspection. Even if the traditional presumption of constitutionality had
been applied, this evidence might well have been considered sufficient to overcome it
and to satisfy the complainant's burden of proof, thus passing to the state the burden
of coming forward with additional evidence. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2487, 2489
(2d ed. 1923). It is true that there was language in the opinion in the Foote case to the
effect that a "presumption of invalidity" was raised by the statutory provision for in-
termingling of funds; but the Court unnecessarily extended this holding in the instant
case by declaring a statute unconstitutional where there was no proof that the tax
receipts exceeded inspection costs.
The effect of applying this presumption to the principal case was to place upon the
state the burden of proving that the amounts collected under this statute did not sub-
stantially exceed the amounts necessary for inspection and supervision. But the mere
fact of intermingling seems an insufficient justification for a failure to apply the tradi-
tional presumptions of constitutionality. There seems no material distinction between
those taxing statutes levied to pay inspection expenses which provide for intermingling
of funds and those which provide that the receipts be kept separate. It is well settled
that one attacking the latter type of statute must show that the tax receipts substan-
tially exceeded inspection expenses. Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 16o, E64
(1918); McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 203 U.S. 38, 52 (19o6). In neither
type can it be ascertained from the face of the statute whether the amounts collected
will or will not be more than permissible; nor does the intermingling type of statute
indicate on its face that the operation of the common fund will be to the disadvantage
of the complainant. See 57 Sup.Ct. 397, 404. If the presumption were raised only
when it was shown that the state had exclusive access to the necessary information, a
more plausible exception would be presented. See Selma, Rome & D. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 139 U.S. 56o, 567 (I891); cf. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2486 (2d ed. 1923). In the
instant case, however, the Court passed the burden of proof to the state without re-
quiring the plaintiff to show that it had made a reasonable attempt to secure such in-
formation. See the dissenting opinion of Cardozo, J., 57 Sup. Ct. 397, 405-06.
